Ronk v. State
| Docket Number: | 2015-DR-01373-SCT Linked Case(s): 2015-DR-01373-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 01-17-2019 Opinion Author: Waller, C.J. Holding: Leave to Seek Post-Conviction Relief Denied. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Death penalty post-conviction relief - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Disproportionality of sentence - Constitutionality of death penalty statute - Section 99-39-21(1) - Preservation of record Judge(s) Concurring: Randolph, P.J., Maxwell, Beam, Chamberlin and Ishee, JJ. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Coleman, J., with separate written opinion Concur in Part, Dissent in Part Joined By 1: Kitchens, P.J., and King, J. Procedural History: PCR Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DEATH PENALTY - PCR |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-08-2010 Appealed from: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: HON. LISA P. DODSON Disposition: Convicted of captial murder and sentenced to death; and armed robbery and sentenced to 30 years Case Number: B2401-09-434 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Timothy Robert Ronk a/k/a Timothy Ronk a/k/a Timothy R. Ronk |
OFFICE OF CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL BY: ALEXANDER DUNLAP MOORHEAD KASSOFF |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: BRAD ALAN SMITH | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Death penalty post-conviction relief - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Disproportionality of sentence - Constitutionality of death penalty statute - Section 99-39-21(1) - Preservation of record |
| Summary of the Facts: | Timothy Ronk was convicted of capital murder and armed robbery. He was sentenced to death and thirty years in prison, respectively. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. Ronk now moves for leave to seek post-conviction relief in the trial court. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Ineffective assistance of counsel Ronk argues that his attorneys were ineffective both at the sentencing phase and at the guilt phase. Ronk attributes counsel’s ineffectiveness to the poor health of and prescription-drug use by one of his attorneys. While the attorney’s illnesses and prescription-drug use are troubling, the weight of authority says illness and drug use alone do not render counsel ineffective. The critical inquiry is whether counsel’s performance was deficient and, if so, whether the deficiency prejudiced Ronk. The record shows that, even when he was hospitalized, the attorney tried to coordinate filing motions. And it supports that a coordinated team effort took place at trial. Although counsel’s mitigation investigation arguably was deficient, Ronk must also make a substantial showing of prejudice. In that regard, he falls short. The new evidence Ronk provides is mostly cumulative. And to the extent the new evidence Ronk provides is beneficial, it is equally damaging. Issue 2: Disproportionality of sentence On direct appeal, Ronk claimed his death sentence was “excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” The Court held that his sentence was neither excessive nor disproportionate. Ronk concedes that disproportionality was addressed on direct appeal but argues that “[a] review of cases with facts meaningfully similar to [his] case dispels the notion that [his] sentence was not ‘disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.’” This claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Issue 3: Constitutionality of death-penalty statute On direct appeal, Ronk challenged the death penalty. He now argues that Mississippi’s death-penalty statute is unconstitutional because “the death penalty, as applied, is inherently arbitrary and capricious, despite all efforts to eliminate unfairness.” Because Ronk challenged the constitutionality of Mississippi’s capital-sentencing scheme on direct appeal, this claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. And even if res judicata does not apply, Ronk cannot show an exception from the waiver bar under section 99-39-21(1), which requires “a showing of cause and actual prejudice.” Issue 4: Preservation of record Ronk says that, “[u]pon information and belief, the jury in [his] case was all white with one African-American male as an alternate.” Counsel did not object to the State’s four strikes for cause and eight peremptory strikes. Counsel did not object to any. But trial counsel did not preserve a record of the venire’s racial composition. This lack of record, Ronk argues, leaves an incomplete picture of the trial proceeding and renders a meaningful post-conviction proceeding impossible. This issue is waived. A trial objection is required to preserve a Batson claim for appeal. In addition, Ronk fails to present a substantial showing that the lack of record denied him a state or federal right. |
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