Averitt Express, Inc. v. Collins


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Docket Number: 2014-WC-00936-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 07-21-2015
Opinion Author: Barnes, J.
Holding: Affirmed.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Workers' compensation - Definition of employee - Section 71-3-3(d) - Implied contract for hire - Mutual consent
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Ishee, Maxwell, Fair and James, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Wilson, J.
Dissenting Author : Carlton, J., Without Separate Written Opinion
Procedural History: Admin or Agency Judgment
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WORKERS' COMPENSATION

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 06-11-2014
Appealed from: MISSISSIPPI WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Disposition: Affirmed administrative judge's ruling that the appellee was entitled to workers' compensation benefits
Case Number: 1211108-M-2309-E

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Averitt Express, Inc.




M. W. ZUMMACH, GREGORY C. MORTON



 

Appellee: Kevin Collins ROGEN K. CHHABRA, DARRYL MOSES GIBBS, CANDACE GREGORY MAYBERRY, ASHLEY LEKESHA HENDRICKS, BENJAMIN SETH THOMPSON  

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Topic: Workers' compensation - Definition of employee - Section 71-3-3(d) - Implied contract for hire - Mutual consent

Summary of the Facts: Kevin Collins, a job applicant with Averitt Express Inc., injured his knee while performing a pre-employment job-function test during the hiring/orientation process. He filed a workers’ compensation claim, but Averitt argued that Collins was not an employee. An administrative judge with the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission ruled that Collins was entitled to benefits. Averitt appealed to the full Commission which affirmed. Averitt appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Subject to certain exceptions, section 71-3-3(d) defines an “employee” as “any person . . . in the service of an employer under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or oral, express or implied[.]” The elements of a contract for hire are mutual consent, consideration, and right of control. In this case, the AJ concluded that the elements of an employment contract were present, and Collins was an “employee,” as defined by section 71-3-3(d), when his injury occurred. However, Averitt argues that there was no mutual consent by the parties to any contract for hire. Mutual consent is defined as a meeting of the minds of both parties to a contract; the fact that each agrees to all the terms and conditions, in the same sense and with the same meaning as the others. Collins applied for a truck-driver position with Averitt. Averitt sent a letter to Collins, providing him with the details of its hiring and orientation process. Although the letter expressed that the job offer was contingent on Collins’s ability to pass the road test, it also said it was proud to have him as a member of the team and looked forward to meeting him during orientation. The letter also informed Collins that the failure to complete the requirements of the road test would “result in Averitt rescinding [his] job offer.” This language would indicate that Collins was not taking the pre-employment road test merely to be considered for hire, but rather that Averitt had every intention of hiring him had he passed the road-test requirements. Although Collins was never on Averitt’s payroll, he was compensated for attending the first day of orientation and for his mileage. Averitt also paid for Collins’s hotel room while he was attending orientation. Averitt acknowledges that Collins received compensation for his expenses, but it argues there is no consideration because his “activities in participating in the road test in no way benefitted Averitt.” However, submitting Collins to the road test, in order to test his ability to perform the job requirements, benefitted Averitt in its business of hiring truck drivers. Averitt also claims that it “had no right to control Collins’s physical conduct in the performance of any duties as he was not an employee and had not been assigned any duties.” However, Averitt clearly controlled the road-test environment, and its fleet manager instructed Collins on how to exit/enter the vehicle when performing the test. Collins injured himself attempting to comply with Averitt’s instructions while at its facility. Thus, Averitt, as an employer, had right of control over Collins’s actions in performing the test. There was substantial evidence to support the Commission’s determination that Collins was an Averitt employee at the time of his injury, under an implied contract for hire, and that he was entitled to benefits.


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