Ronk v. State
| Docket Number: | 2011-DP-00410-SCT Linked Case(s): 2011-DP-00410-SCT ; 2011-DP-00410-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-07-2015 Opinion Author: Waller, C.J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Death penalty direct appeal - Imperfect-self-defense instruction - Arson instruction - One-continuous-transaction instruction - Section 97-3-19(2) - Sufficiency of evidence - Ineffective assistance of counsel - M.R.A.P. 22(b) - Sequestration of jury - URCCC 10.2 - Admission of evidence - Compensation for trial testimony - Sentencing hearing - Aggravating factors - Imposition of death penalty - Section 99-19-101(7) - Section 99-19-105 - Proportionality of death sentence Judge(s) Concurring: Randolph, P.J., Lamar, Chandler, Pierce and Coleman, JJ. Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Kitchens, J., Specially Concurs With Separate Written Opinion Joined by Dickinson, P.J. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Dickinson, P.J., With Separate Written Opinion Concur in Part, Concur in Result Joined By 1: King, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - DEATH PENALTY - DIRECT APPEAL |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-08-2010 Appealed from: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: LISA P. DODSON Disposition: Found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death District Attorney: Joel Smith Case Number: B2401-09-434 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Timothy Robert Ronk a/k/a Timothy Ronk a/k/a Timothy R. Ronk |
OFFICE OF THE STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER: ALISON R. STEINER, JUSTIN T. COOK |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: MELANIE DOTSON THOMAS, JASON L. DAVIS, MARVIN L. WHITE, JR., CAMERON L. BENTON, BRAD A. SMITH, JOHN R. HENRY, JR. | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Death penalty direct appeal - Imperfect-self-defense instruction - Arson instruction - One-continuous-transaction instruction - Section 97-3-19(2) - Sufficiency of evidence - Ineffective assistance of counsel - M.R.A.P. 22(b) - Sequestration of jury - URCCC 10.2 - Admission of evidence - Compensation for trial testimony - Sentencing hearing - Aggravating factors - Imposition of death penalty - Section 99-19-101(7) - Section 99-19-105 - Proportionality of death sentence |
| Summary of the Facts: | Timothy Ronk was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The jury also found Ronk guilty of armed robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty years’ imprisonment. Ronk appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Jury instructions Ronk argues that the trial court erred in denying his imperfect-self-defense instruction, in giving the State’s arson instruction, and in giving a one-continuous-transaction instruction. While a defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case, the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. With regard to the imperfect self-defense instruction, Ronk argues that because no weapons were found inside the victim’s house, but two shotguns were found in the studio apartment behind the house, a reasonable jury could find him guilty of imperfect-self-defense manslaughter. Under the theory of imperfect self-defense, an intentional killing may be considered manslaughter if done without malice but under a bona fide (but unfounded) belief that it was necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm. A jury instruction on a lesser-included offense should be granted where a rational jury could find the defendant not guilty of the principal charge made in the indictment but guilty of a lesser included offense. Ronk did not offer a defense to the underlying felony of arson. If the jury accepted Ronk’s theory that he stabbed the victim while acting in imperfect self-defense, he would still be guilty of manslaughter under section 97-3-19(2). Ronk’s proffered theory of imperfect self-defense does not eliminate an essential element of his capital-murder charge. No evidence was presented which would have allowed the jury to separate the killing from the arson and convict Ronk only of manslaughter. With regard to the State’s arson instruction, Ronk argues that arson is not a lesser-included offense of capital murder. Because Ronk agreed to the submission of this instruction, he is procedurally barred from raising the issue on appeal. In addition, because the jury convicted Ronk of capital murder, any alleged error in instructing the jury separately on arson would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. With regard to the one-continuous-transaction instruction, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on the one-continuous-transaction doctrine, which was adopted by the Court to define the requisite causal nexus between a killing and the underlying felony in a capital felony-murder case. Issue 2: Sufficiency of evidence Ronk argues that because he did not intend to commit an arson at the time he stabbed the victim, the evidence presented to the jury does not support a capital-murder conviction. However, there is no merit in Ronk’s assertion that the arson was only incidental to the killing. Ronk admitted to pouring gasoline throughout the victim’s house and setting it on fire after stabbing her multiple times, leaving her incapacitated. Dr. McGarry offered substantial evidence indicating the victim was still alive at the time of the fire, but was unable to escape due to her stab wounds. Thus, the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain a conviction of capital murder with the underlying felony of arson. Issue 3: Ineffective assistance of counsel Generally, ineffective-assistance claims are more appropriately brought during post-conviction proceedings. However, M.R.A.P. 22(b) provides that claim of ineffectiveness may be raised on direct appeal “if such issues are based on facts fully apparent from the record.” Ronk argues that his trial attorney’s performance during the sentencing phase of trial was deficient, because his attorney suffered from significant medical problems throughout the course of his representation of Ronk, his attorney enlisted the assistance of an expert witness who was not equipped to perform a mitigation study in a capital case, his counsel impermissibly failed to request jury instructions on statutory mitigating factors, and his attorney made a prejudicially inadequate closing argument. Because these claims are not based on facts fully apparent from the record, this claim is dismissed without prejudice to Ronk’s ability to raise it properly in a post-conviction relief proceeding. Issue 4: Sequestration of jury For the first time on appeal, Ronk challenges the trial court’s sequestration procedure. Because Ronk did not submit a contemporaneous objection to this procedure, his claim is procedurally barred on appeal. In addition, it is without merit. Ronk argues that the trial court violated URCCC 10.2 by letting the venire panel go home after the final jury panel had been selected. However, the Court has approved of this exact procedure. Issue 5: Admission of evidence Ronk challenges several of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings during the culpability phase of his trial. He argues that the trial court erred in limiting a witness’s testimony regarding Ronk’s statements to her about the victim. In his brief, Ronk refers to “additional statements” that he sought to admit into evidence, but no “additional statements” were ever offered by Ronk during the witness’s cross-examination. Thus, there is no error. Ronk argues that the trial court erred in admitting a knife found in Ronk’s car when he was arrested in Florida, because it lacked relevance and prejudiced his defense. When there is evidence that a weapon could have caused an injury and some connection between the defendant and the weapon exists, the weapon will be deemed relevant and admissible. Although no forensic evidence linked the knife to the victim’s murder in this case, Dr. McGarry testified that the knife was consistent with the type of knife that caused the victim’s stab wounds, even after considering the fact that Exhibit 50 had a serrated back. Thus, Dr. McGarry’s testimony supported the knife’s admissibility. Ronk argues that the admission of the victim’s bank records violated his right to confront the witnesses against him. The records showed that someone had used the victim’s debit card after she had died. Because Ronk did not raise a contemporaneous objection to the admission of the bank records, his argument on this issue is procedurally barred. In addition, any conceivable error in the admission of these records is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The bank statements did not directly implicate Ronk in the victim’s murder, but they helped explain the investigation of the victim’s death. Ronk argues that the trial court erred in allowing a Walmart employee who sold Ronk a diamond ring, to testify regarding her out-of-court identification of Ronk. However, Ronk did not object to the admission of any of this evidence. Thus, his claim is procedurally barred. In addition, the employee’s pretrial identification of Ronk was reliable. She had ample opportunity to view Ronk as she assisted him with the purchase of a diamond ring. She described her interaction with Ronk at length, displaying a high degree of attention to detail. The accuracy of her testimony was corroborated by the receipt of Ronks’ purchase, and the accuracy of her identification was bolstered by her positive in-court identification of Ronk. The length of time between her interaction with Ronk and her identification of him was, at most, one day. Thus, her pretrial identification of Ronk was not so unduly suggestive as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of an irreparable misidentification. Ronk argues that the State presented impermissibly inflammatory evidence at various stages of the trial. However, Ronk failed to object to any of this testimony or argument by the State. Thus, the claim is barred. Issue 6: Compensation for trial testimony Ronk argues that the State overpaid a witness, who traveled from Florida, for her testimony and concealed it from the defense. However, the record shows that the State’s motion to secure the witness’s attendance, which was filed in the trial court approximately six months before trial, specified that the State would pay the reasonable and necessary expenses of travel and accommodations. After trial, the State filed a motion to pay the reasonable and necessary expenses related to the witness’s travel. Ronk had an opportunity to challenge this payment in the trial court, as the hearing on his post-trial motions was not held until three months later. He failed to object. In addition, Ronk presents no evidence indicating that this payment influenced the witness’s testimony in any way. Issue 7: Sentencing hearing Ronk argues that the trial court instructed the jury improperly regarding the aggravating and mitigating circumstances it was required to consider during the sentencing hearing. At the conclusion of Ronk’s sentencing hearing, Ronk was granted a catch-all mitigation instruction. However, Ronk did not request specific instructions on any of the statutory mitigating circumstances. Because Ronk did not request any instructions on statutory mitigating circumstances or object to the mitigation instruction actually given, he is procedurally barred from raising this issue for the first time on appeal. Ronk argues that the trial court erred in denying his proffered sentencing instructions D-S-2 and D-S-9, which informed the jury of its ability to sentence Ronk to life without parole even if it found no mitigating circumstances worthy of consideration. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing D-S-2 and D-S-9. The Court previously has found similarly worded instructions to be mercy instructions. Capital defendants are not entitled to a mercy instruction. Ronk argues that the trial court erred in denying D-S-4. Because the method of execution is of no concern to the jury, portions of D-S-4 incorrectly stated the law. In addition, the substance of D-S-4 was sufficiently covered by other instructions. Ronk argues that the trial court erred in denying instruction D-S-7, which would have informed the jury that, if it chose not to sentence Ronk to death, his sentence of life without parole would not be reduced or suspended, and he would never be eligible for parole. However, except in habitual offender cases, where a life sentence would automatically mean life without parole, the parole issue should not be considered by the sentencing jury. Ronk argues that the trial court erred by failing to give his proposed instruction D-S-8 which informed the jury that the trial court would sentence Ronk to life imprisonment without parole if the jury was unable to agree unanimously on punishment. D-S-8 correctly stated the law, but it was also covered by other instructions. Thus, there was no error. Ronk argues that the trial court erred in giving C-S-1, because it prohibited the jury from considering mercy or sympathy. Because Ronk failed to object to C-S-1 at the sentencing hearing, and because Ronk cites no authority in support of his argument, this issue is procedurally barred. Issue 8: Aggravating factors At Ronk’s sentencing hearing, the State presented evidence of two statutory aggravators: “the capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged . . . In the commission of . . . Arson,” and “[t]he capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.” Ronk argues that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider these aggravating factors, because they were not supported by the evidence. With regard to arson, sufficient evidence supports a finding that the victim was still alive at the time of the arson, and she was unable to escape the fire due to the wounds inflicted upon her by Ronk. With regard to especially heinous, the State presented evidence through the testimony of Dr. McGarry that Ronk’s knife severed a major artery in the victim’s chest, punctured both her lungs, and pierced her liver, filling her chest and abdominal cavities with blood. He also explained that the victim was still alive and breathing during the fire; that she had suffered burning and blistering to the lining of her mouth, tongue, larynx, and windpipe; and that the fire had destroyed much of her flesh down to the bone. To add to the cruel nature of the crime, the evidence showed that Ronk also stole valuables from the victim’s home and used her money to buy an engagement ring for his girlfriend and to escape to Florida. Thus, the State presented sufficient evidence to present this aggravating circumstance to the jury. Issue 9: Imposition of death penalty Ronk argues that his indictment was constitutionally defective because it failed to charge all elements necessary to impose the death penalty. The Court has explicitly rejected the arguments presented by Ronk. Ronk argues that section 99-19-101(7) is unconstitutional, because it includes a scienter factor that has not been approved, the defendant “contemplated lethal force would be employed.” But Ronk concedes that his sentencing jury did not rely on this scienter factor in reaching its decision. Moreover, Ronk acknowledged at trial that the Court already has upheld the constitutionality of section 99-19-101(7)(d). Ronk argues that the use of armed robbery both as an element of his capital-murder charge and as an aggravating circumstance supporting the death penalty is unconstitutional. However, neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Mississippi Supreme Court has found constitutional error in the use of the underlying felony as both an element of capital felony murder and an aggravating circumstance supporting the imposition of the death penalty. Ronk argues that Mississippi’s lethal-injection procedure violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. However, the Court has held that Mississippi’s lethal-injection procedure passes muster under the Eighth Amendment. Ronk argues that section 99-19-105, as applied by the Court, fails to provide for adequate or meaningful appellate review. However, Mississippi’s capital sentencing scheme is entirely constitutional, in the absence of some intervening precedent. Issue 10: Proportionality of death sentence Section 99-19-105 requires the Court to conduct an examination of Ronk’s death sentence. The record includes no evidence that Ronk’s sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of three statutory aggravating circumstances: the capital offense was committed by a person under a sentence of imprisonment, the capital offense was committed while Ronk was engaged in the commission of an arson, and the capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The evidence supports the jury’s finding of the aggravators. After considering the circumstances of Ronk’s crime and comparing it to similar cases, the jury’s imposition of the death penalty in this case is not excessive or disproportionate. |
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