Ravenstein v. Hawkins
| Docket Number: | 2012-CA-01085-SCT Linked Case(s): 2012-CA-01085-SCT ; 2012-CA-01085-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 07-17-2014 Opinion Author: Waller, C.J. Holding: Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Conservatorship - Modification of child support - M.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) - Material change in circumstances - Section 93-13-251 - Appointment of conservator - Statutory requirements - Standing Judge(s) Concurring: Dickinson and Randolph, P.JJ., Lamar, Kitchens, Chandler, Pierce and Coleman, JJ. Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Pierce, J., Specially Concurs With Separate Written Opinion Joined by Dickinson, P.J., Kitchens and Chandler, JJ. King, J., Specially Concurs With Separate Written Opinion Joined by Dickinson, P.J., Kitchens, Chandler and Pierce, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 04-18-2012 Appealed from: MADISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT Judge: CYNTHIA L. BREWER Disposition: Chancery Court appointed appellant's ex-wife as conservator for the couple's adult son. Case Number: 96-350-B |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | John W. Ravenstein |
PAUL E. ROGERS |
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| Appellee: | Elisha Ravenstein (Hawkins) | CONNIE M. SMITH, JON H. POWELL | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Conservatorship - Modification of child support - M.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) - Material change in circumstances - Section 93-13-251 - Appointment of conservator - Statutory requirements - Standing |
| Summary of the Facts: | Elisha Ravenstein Hawkins was granted a divorce from her husband John Ravenstein in 1998. Elisha was awarded physical and legal custody of the couple’s seven-year-old son Ryan, with liberal visitation awarded to John. Ryan suffers from serious medical conditions that have rendered him severely mentally and physically disabled. John was ordered to pay $1,500 a month in child support for Ryan’s life, along with Ryan’s health and dental insurance. John and Elisha were ordered to share all uncovered medical expenses and special-equipment expenses equally for Ryan’s life. The parties abided by the chancery court’s judgment without modification for thirteen years. In 2011, Elisha filed a Petition for Appointment of Conservator, contending that now twenty-year-old Ryan was so incapable of managing his own person and estate that it was necessary to have a conservator appointed to have charge of his person and estate. John responded by filing his own Petition for Appointment of Conservator, requesting the chancery court to appoint him as Ryan’s conservator or alternatively, to appoint Elisha and himself as co-conservators. On Ryan’s twenty-first birthday, John ceased paying his child-support payments to Elisha and began depositing the funds in the registry of the Madison County Chancery Court. John then filed a motion for relief from the chancery court’s 1998 judgment. In 2012, the parties entered an Agreed Order stipulating the need for a conservator over Ryan’s person. The chancellor granted Elisha’s petition to be appointed Ryan’s conservator, denied John’s petition to be appointed Ryan’s conservator, and denied John’s motion for relief from the divorce judgment. John appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Child support John argues that the chancellor in the divorce action lacked the authority to extend John’s child-support obligation beyond the date that Ryan reached the age of majority, which in Mississippi is twenty-one years old. John never appealed the 1998 judgment but waited until Ryan turned twenty-one and then filed a motion for relief from that judgment and a motion for modification of child support. John filed his motion for relief from the 1998 divorce judgment pursuant to M.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), (5) and (6). The chancellor denied John’s motion as untimely, finding that it had not been brought within a reasonable time after the entry of the divorce judgment. John argues that the chancery court had no discretion to deny the relief requested because the provision in the divorce judgment requiring lifetime child support is void. The only challenge available to John is that the chancery court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the 1998 proceeding. Even if the chancellor’s decision to award lifetime child support was erroneous as a matter of law, as John argues, that decision was merely an erroneous exercise of the chancery court’s valid subject-matter jurisdiction over matters of divorce, alimony, and child support. Thus, its judgment is not void, and the correctness of its decision cannot be the target of a collateral attack under Rule 60(b)(4). Modification of child support may be warranted only where there is a showing of an after-arising material change in circumstances regarding one or more of the interested parties, i.e., the father, mother, or child. In the 1998 divorce judgment, the chancellor ordered John to make monthly child support payments for Ryan’s lifetime due to the fact that Ryan’s severe medical conditions would permanently prevent him from caring for himself. John made child-support payments for roughly thirteen years. At the time of the divorce, John certainly could anticipate that his son eventually would reach the age of majority. Thus, the record is clear that John failed to present the court with evidence of any unanticipated material change in circumstances warranting a modification of child support. Issue 2: Conservator Chancery courts generally are given wide discretion to take all necessary steps to conserve and protect the best interest of these wards of the court in determining the appropriate person to be appointed as a conservator. Here, the chancellor held that John had failed to produce credible evidence relating to any adverse material change in circumstances that would warrant a change in custody or visitation. The chancery court erroneously applied the legal standard for modification of child custody in determining who should be appointed as Ryan’s conservator. The conservatorship hearing was a new and distinct proceeding. The chancellor’s determinations concerning Ryan’s disabilities at the age of seven did not constitute a per se appointment of Elisha as his lifetime guardian. Section 93-13-251 gives the chancery court the authority to appoint a conservator first “for the management of the property” of the ward. Then, “if the court deems it advisable,” the conservator may also be granted “charge and custody” over the ward’s person. The conservatorship hearing and the court’s ruling on the issue were concerned only with Ryan’s physical custody. But the chancellor appointed Elisha as conservator of Ryan’s person and estate, even though no evidence was presented regarding who could best manage Ryan’s estate. Thus, the chancellor’s appointment of Elisha as Ryan’s conservator is reversed and the case remanded for a new conservatorship hearing. Issue 3: Statutory requirements With respect to the child-support funds received by Elisha for Ryan’s benefit, the chancellor was correct in not requiring Elisha to post a bond, provide an accounting of those funds, or seek court approval before spending those funds. The monthly payments made from John to Elisha for Ryan’s benefit still constitute child support. However, because Ryan may receive funds in the future that will constitute a separate financial estate, Elisha should have been required to comply with the statutory safeguards in place for conservatorships. Mississippi statutory law is clear that conservators, like other legal guardians, must comply with certain procedures before they are allowed to proceed with their duties. By exempting Elisha from the statutory requirements for managing conservatorships, the chancellor effectively removed Elisha from judicial accountability for any of the funds she might receive in the future on Ryan’s behalf. Issue 4: Standing John argues that the chancellor erred in awarding post-majority child support to Elisha because Elisha did not have standing to seek such support. However, the chancellor did not award support to Elisha, but merely denied John’s requests to be freed from a prior order of the court. |
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