Caterpillar Fin. Services Corp. v. Burroughs Diesel, Inc.
Docket Number: | 2011-CA-01851-COA Linked Case(s): 2011-CA-01851-COA ; 2011-CT-01851-SCT |
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Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Date: 08-27-2013 Holding: The motion for rehearing is denied. |
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Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Replevin - Mechanic's lien - Circuit court judgment - Attorney's fees - M.R.C.P. 37 - Storage costs - Section 85-7-251 - M.R.C.P. 56(c) - Section 85-7-101 - County court judgment - Priority jurisdiction - Section 9-9-21(1) - M.R.C.P. 13(a) - Discovery - M.R.C.P. 34 - Inspection Dissenting Author : James, J., would grant. Nature of the Case: Motion for Rehearing |
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Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-05-2011 Appealed from: Jones County Circuit Court Judge: Billy Joe Landrum Case Number: 2010-96-CV9 |
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Consolidated: 2011-CA-01469-COA Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation v. Burroughs Diesel, Inc.; Jones Circuit Court 2nd District; LC Case #: 2011-45-CV5; Ruling Date: 09/01/2011; Ruling Judge: Billy Joe Landrum |
Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
Appellant: | Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation |
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Appellee: | Burroughs Diesel, Inc. |
Synopsis provided by: ![]() If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
Topic: | Replevin - Mechanic's lien - Circuit court judgment - Attorney's fees - M.R.C.P. 37 - Storage costs - Section 85-7-251 - M.R.C.P. 56(c) - Section 85-7-101 - County court judgment - Priority jurisdiction - Section 9-9-21(1) - M.R.C.P. 13(a) - Discovery - M.R.C.P. 34 - Inspection |
Summary of the Facts: | Cat Financial Services Corporation brought a replevin action, in county court, for an order awarding it immediate possession of a Caterpillar excavator. The day after Burroughs Diesel Inc. answered the replevin action, Burroughs commenced a claim to enforce its mechanic’s lien in the chancery court. The chancery court transferred the case not to the county court but to the circuit court. A judgment has been entered in each case and appealed. The replevin claim is on appeal from a final judgment, and the mechanic’s lien claim is an appeal of a summary judgment. |
Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Circuit court judgment The circuit court awarded Burroughs $10,808 in attorney’s fees, twenty-five percent of the amount of the lien awarded. The circuit court did not specifically state the basis for its award of attorney’s fees. There was no legal basis for this award. Attorney’s fees may only be awarded if there is statutory authority or a contractual provision that authorizes the award of attorney’s fees, or if an award of punitive damages is proper. None of these circumstances were present here. Although Burroughs argues that the court awarded the attorney’s fees under M.R.C.P. 37, neither the order denying the motion to compel nor the final judgment indicated that attorney’s fees were appropriate under Rule 37. Thus, the circuit court’s judgment that awarded Burroughs attorney’s fees is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. The circuit court granted Burroughs’s claim for a $30,925 lien for storage costs, based on section 85-7-251. Cat Financial argues that Burroughs is not entitled to a lien under section 85-7-251 because Burroughs did not follow the statutory requirements. The affidavits and materials filed in support of the motion for summary judgment discuss storage costs, but do not satisfy the statutory requirements of section 85-7-251. Therefore, under M.R.C.P. 56(c), Burroughs was not entitled to a summary judgment. The circuit court granted Burroughs’s claim for a mechanic’s lien under section 85-7-101 for the labor and material to repair the excavator in the amount of $12,307.02. However, there are material facts in dispute. Cat Financial claims that, as the owner of the excavator, it did not authorize Burroughs to make the repairs. Cat Financial also claims that since it has not been allowed to inspect the excavator, it cannot determine if the repairs Burroughs made were reasonable or necessary. There is a genuine issue of a material fact in dispute – who owned the excavator in July 2008, when Burroughs repaired the excavator. If the lease was in effect in July 2008, then the mechanic’s lien is valid (assuming the repairs were reasonable and necessary). If the lease was not in effect, then there was no owner authorization for the repairs, and the rule of caveat emptor applied to Burroughs. The county court’s order did not address the reasonableness or necessity of the repairs. The stipulations were not sufficient evidence for the court to find proof that Burroughs’s repairs were reasonable and necessary. In the motion for summary judgment, Burroughs offered affidavits, but the affidavits do not state that the repairs were reasonable and necessary. Issue 2: County court judgment The county court’s order did not resolve any claim with prejudice. The county court decided that it would not grant Cat Financial’s request for replevin, i.e., immediate possession, and anticipated that Cat Financial may be entitled to possession upon the resolution of the mechanic’s lien action, pending in circuit court. The county court’s order is an inartful attempt to transfer the replevin action to the circuit court so that all claims would be pending before and be decided by one court. The county court order was appealed to the circuit court. However, the circuit court affirmed the judgment before Cat Financial even filed its appellant’s brief and stated the issues that were raised on appeal. On remand, the circuit court should decide Cat Financial’s claim for replevin and Burroughs’s claim for enforcement of a mechanic’s lien. Issue 3: Priority jurisdiction Cat Financial argues that the county court should have decided all of the parties’ dispute. A replevin action may be filed in county court. Pursuant to section 9-9-21(1), county courts have original subject-matter jurisdiction over matters based in law and equity where the amount in controversy does not exceed $200,000. The county court’s jurisdiction is concurrent with both circuit and chancery courts. Section 85-7-101 provides that a claim to enforce a mechanic’s lien may be filed “in any court of competent jurisdiction.” Thus, Burroughs could have filed its claim in county court. This issue could have been avoided if Burroughs had filed a compulsory counterclaim under M.R.C.P. 13(a). In future similar actions, it would be preferable for such a dispute as this one to be determined in one court proceeding. Issue 4: Discovery Cat Financial has repeatedly sought to inspect the excavator to verify its condition and the repairs that were made. Cat Financial filed a request to inspect under M.R.C.P. 34 and asked for inspection dates. Burroughs argues that Cat Financial never took any other actions like filing a motion to compel, and no court order compelled an inspection. Court intervention should not be required to obtain an inspection. However, once court intervention is requested, the county and circuit courts should immediately order the inspection or require the parties to appear and show cause why it did not occur. Although Cat Financial seeks the dismissal of Burroughs’s asserted mechanic’s lien for discovery violations, dismissal is not the appropriate remedy. On remand, the parties, or the court if necessary, should see to it that the inspection occurs promptly. |
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